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THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AIDS
SINCEthemid-thirties federal government aids have emerged as a new,
important force conditioning the level and movement of private resi-
dential construction—a force that may have modified the operation of
the historical factors analyzed in some of the preceding chapters. Within
less than twenty years the federal aid programs have attained a
strategic position. Whatever their original objectives, they have become
deeply imbedded in the processes of capital formation and financing
in residential construction. Although objectives, methods, and intensity
of aids have changed, the aids themselves have become widely accepted
as essential parts of the institutional framework in which new housing
is produced and financed.
It is important, therefore, to trace the magnitude of these programs
and to assess their effects on capital formation in residential real
estate. At least three questions are important: Have federal credit
aids served to increase the total volume of residential building over
and above the level that would have been attained without them? Have
they tended to widen the market for new dwellings, in the sense that
they have reduced carrying costs to mortgage borrowers to a point
where occupancy of new housing has become possible for buyers and
renters who otherwise would have been unable to afford new housing?
Have they operated to change the distribution of new construction as
between dwellings for sale and rent? Other questions that relate to the
role of federal aids in mortgage financing, the instrument by which the
government influences residential construction, will be discussed in
Chapter XV.
The programs considered here include the insurance of residential
mortgage loans by the Federal Housing Administration, the guarantee
of veterans' home loans by the Veterans' Administration,2 and the
operations of the Federal National Mortgage Association in the so-
An earlier version of this chapter was published in 1953 as part of The Role
of Federal Credit Aids in Residential Construction, by Leo Grebler (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 39).
1Federalactivities designed directly to affect new residential construction did
not exist before the National Housing Act of 1934, except for some quantitatively
insignificant operations during World War I, primarily those of the United States
Housing Corporation and the Emergency Fleet Corporation. Cf. Miles L. Colean,
Housing for Defense, Twentieth Century Fund, 1940.
2Whilethere are legal and financial differences between the "insurance" of
loans by the FHA and the "guarantee" of loans by the VA, the generic term
"insurance" will sometimes be applied for convenience when the combined im-
portance of the two programs is discussed.144 ROLE OF FEDERAL AIDS
called secondary mortgage market. These programs have provided
assistance in the financing of both existing and new construction, but
the analysis here will focus on their importance to the volume and
financing of new housing.8
New Residential Construction under FHA and VA Programs
From 1935 through 1953 more than 4% million new dwelling units
were financed with mortgage loans that were insured by the Federal
Housing Administration or guaranteed by the Veterans' Administration.
This number represents about 40 per cent of all new dwelling units
built during this period, and equals two-thirds the entire volume
constructed during the twenties. Of the 4% million dwelling units, over
3.3 million were financed with FHA and VA loans made during the
eight postwar years 1946 to 1953. Changes over time in the quantitative
importance of these programs are shown in Chart 17 and Tables 37
and 38.
The number of new dwelling units financed with mortgage loans
insured by the FHA5 increased rapidly from 1935 to 1941 and repre-
Other activities of the federal government in the fields of housing and mortgage
finance, such as tIle operations of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation Mortgage Company, and the Home Loan Bank
System, have influenced the volume of new construction at times. But their effects
have been less direct or more sporadic than those of the programs included in
the analysis. The insurance by the Federal Housing Administration of loans for
alteration, repair, and modernization of existing structures under Title I of the
National Housing Act has affected expenditures for additions and alterations,
which are part of capital formation in residential realestate. However, the
quantitative importance of this program for the total volume of additions and
alterations cannot be measured inasmuch as it covers repairs and installations of
consumer durables as well as structural improvements. There is no place or need
here for a review of all of the many activities of the federal government in this
field, and of their origin and evolution. For such a review see Miles L. Colean,
The Impact of Gouernment on Real Estate Finance in the United States, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1950, esp. Chaps. 5-8. R. J. Saulnier's "The Growth
of Federal Lending, Loan Insurance and Guarantees" (mimeographed, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1952) presents comprehensive basic data on
housing and other programs as well as a résume of the programs. This manuscript
shows also the important position of housing in aggregate federal lending and
loan insurance activities. See also C. Lowell Harriss, History and Policies of the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951.
terms "financed with" and "built with" FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed
mortgage loans require qualification. The data for new dwelling units built under
FHA auspices are based on "first compliance" inspections and denote starts of
dwelling units. A varying proportion of dwelling units built with FHA inspection
have been sold upon completion with conventional mortgage financing or, since
1945, with mortgage loans guaranteed by the Veterans' Administration. After
June 1950 the data for new dwelling units built under VA auspices are also based
on compliance inspections. For preceding periods they represent rough estimates
by the Housing and Home Finance Agency of the starts of new dwelling units sold
with VA-guaranteed first mortgage loans. In terms of final financing of the acquisi-BOLE OF FEDERALAIDS
CHART 17
New Nonform Dwelling Units Financed by Conventional and by
FHA-lnsured and VA-Guaranteed Loans, 1935-1953
Thousands of units
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tion of new residential construction, the data overstate somewhat the importance
of FHA-insured loans and understate somewhat the importance of VA-guaranteed
loans. Thus the combined FHA and VA totals are more accurate than the separate
data for the FHA and the VA. Any overstatement of the combined ratio of new
units financed with FHA and VA loans to total units should be small. Cases in
which construction was started with either an FHA or a VA loan but was finally
financed with a conventional mortgage are at least partially offset by cases in
which houses were started with conventional loans but were bought upon com-
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TABLE37
New Nonfarm Dwelling Units Financed by FHA-Insured and
VA-Guaranteed Loans as a Percentage of All Privately
Financed New Nonfarrn Dwelling Units, 1935-1953
PER CENT OF ALL UNITS
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Source:See Table 38 for absolute numbers, sources, and footnotes.
sented about one-third of all new dwelling units started during the
three years preceding Pearl Harbor, as against 6 and 16 per cent,
respectively, in 1935 and 1936. The relative importance of FHA-insured
loans in the financing of new construction rose sharply during World
War II in conjunction with the war housing program. In 1943 almost
80 per cent of all privately financed new dwelling units were started
under the FHA program.
In 1945 the home loan guarantee provisions of the Veterans' Adminis-
tration under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 began to
operate. Nevertheless, the relative importance of the FHA and VA
programs combined was low in 1945 and 1946, accounting for only
23 per cent of the total number of dwelling units started. From 1947
through 1950, however, approximately one-half of all privately financed
pletion with FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed loans. The above qualifications apply
to Chart 17, Tables 37 and 38, and all text references to ratios of new dwelling
units financed or built with FHA or VA loans to the total number of dwelling units.
Moreover, the timing of starts as estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
that of starts based on FHA and VA compliance inspections are not quite syn-
chronous. These differences are minor and do not affect the orders of magnitude.ROLE OF FEDERAL AIDS 147
TABLE38
New Nonfarm Dwelling Units Financed by FHA-Insured
and VA-Guaranteed Loans Compared with All














































































































































































a Basedon FHA first compliance inspections; excludes a small number of new dwelling units
financed under Title I, Class 3, of the National Housing Act.
b Includes rental and cooperative housing projects and military housing (Sacs. 207, 213, 808,
and 803); Section 611 projects are included under one- to four-family houses.
cEstimatedon basis of first mortgage loans guaranteed by the VA before June 1950; since
then based on VA first compliance inspection.
Source: Housing Statistics, Housing and Home Finance Agency, January 1954, p. 26. The
comparison between starts under the FHA and VA programs with total starts is only approximate
in respect to units for owner occupancy and rental. In this comparison one- and two-family houses
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics are assumed to be built for owner occupancy, and
units in three- or more-family dwellings (multi-family structures) are assumed to be built for
rent. The classification of FHA starts by units in one- to four-family houses and rental projects
does not quite match the BLS classification. Likewise, some of the new houses bought on
VA-guaranteed loans may contain one or more dwelling units for rent. However, the proportion
of dwelling units in FHA- and VA-financed two- to four-family houses (as against single-family
houses) has been very small. Finally, definitions of type of structure vary. For example, a group
of row houses for rent may be classified by the FHA as a multi-family (rental) housing project
and by the BLS as single-family houses.148 ROLE OF FEDERAL AIDS
new dwelling units were acquired with loans insured by the FHA or
guaranteed by the VA, as against the maximum of one-third reached
before World War II under the FHA program alone. The increased
proportion of construction under these government aids was accom-
panied or preceded by the introduction of more liberal credit or
guarantee terms for both FHA and VA mortgages, until the Korean
conffict caused the introduction of credit curbs in the summer and
fall of 1950. Due to the credit restrictions and the withdrawal of rigid
Federal Reserve support of government securities, which tended to
raise bond yields and make investment in FHA and VA loans5 at fixed
maximum interest rates less attractive, new dwelling units financed
with government-insured mortgages fell to 41 per cent of the total in
1951, and this percentage was about maintained in 1952 and 1953.
Effects on the Volume of Construction
The question as to the precise impact of FHA and VA aids on total
residential building activity will forever remain unanswerable. For
there is no basis for estimating what the level and movement of resi-
dential construction would have been in the absence of the federal
programs. It would be rash to assume that all of the new construction
financed with FHA and VA loans represented additional volume that
would not have been produced without these aids. Much of the build-
ing sponsored under the FHA and VA programs would probably have
occurred without them, for the two facilities have operated largely in
a period when rising or high incomes have incr.eased demand for new
residential construction. It would be equally rash to deduce that
these programs have had no influence on the volume of residential
construction.
There is some reason for believing that the FHA program in the
middle and late thirties helped to accelerate the expansion of resi-
dential building—which was indeed its immediate purpose. Recovery
in housing construction is usually dependent on substantial improve-
ment in occupancy and prices and rents of existing facilities, and on
the abatement of foreclosures and distress sales. By 1935, when the
FHA mortgage insurance system began to operate, residential real estate
markets in most areas had only moderately recovered from the Creat
Depression. The refinancing program of the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation was still in progress. Foreclosures were still at a high level
though declining. The rent index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
reached bottom in 1935 and remained low in the next few years. Resi-
5 For simplicity the terms FHA loans and VA loans are used to denote mortgage
loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration and guaranteed by the
Veterans' Administration, respectively.ROLE OF FEDERAL ArDS 149
dential vacancies were still high.6 In the face of these obstacles there
would probably have been even less recovery in residential construction
during the second half of the thirties had it not been for the FHA
program.
Whether federal aids, during the postwar period added substantially
to the volume of residential construction is much more difficult to
judge. The arsenal of federal credit tools was greatly expanded: the
VA home loan program and more massive support of the market for
FHA and VA loans through the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion were added to the FHA mortgage insurance system. As was shown
before, the ratio of new dwelling units built with FHA and VA financ-
ing to the total number of housing units constructed was much greater
than before the war. The special privilege of no-downpayment loans
for veterans facilitated acquisition of new houses by families otherwise
unable to obtain them. Net purchases of $2.5 billion of FHA and VA
loans by the FNMA from 1948 to 1953 added to the funds supplied
for new construction. And there is reason to believe that the volume
of postwar rental housing construction would have been much smaller
had it not been for liberal FHA financing, which created unusual profit
opportunities for rental builders (see below). On the other hand, all
circumstances after the end of the war were favorable to a large volume
of home building even on conventional financing terms, and inflationary
effects of liberal credit under the FHA and VA on the price of new
construction probably canceled much of the demand stimulation that
would have been expected from the greater ease of borrowing under
these programs.
In the long run, to the extent to which government credit aids suc-
ceeded in continuously widening the market for new housing, they
tended to raise the level of new construction. Many changes in federal
housing policies since the middle thirties may, in fact, be interpreted as
efforts to widen the market for new residential facilities by differential
credit terms in favor of lower-priced dwelling units and lower income
groups. It is important, therefore, to trace briefly the development of
this objective and to indicate the extent to which it has been met.
6Nonfarmreal estate foreclosures totsded 229,000 in 1935 as against a depres-
sion peak of 252,000 in 1933. The number declined to 185,000 in 1936, 151,000
in 1937, and 59,000 in 1941 (Foreclosure Reports of the Home Loan Bank
Board). The BLS rent index stood at 94.2 in 1935 and increased to 96.4 in 1936
and 100.9 in 1937, as against a level of roughly 140 to 150 in the twenties
(1935-1939 =100).The Real Property Inventories for sixty-four cities revealed
an average vacancy ratio of 7.8 per cent on January 1, 1934, with a ratio of 12.9
per cent for five- or more-family structures (David L. Wickens, Residential Real
Estate, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941, p. 22).150 ROLE OF FEDERALAIDS
Wideningthe Market
The change in the orientation of the FHA insurance program
furnishes an instructive record on this point. Hearings and Congres-
sional debates leading to its legislative enactment in 1934 reveal an
almost exclusive concern with stimulation of residential construction
and home purchase and modernization, as part of an economic recovery
program, and with improvement of the mortgage system. There is
hardly any reference to the possibility of using FHA insurance as a
device for making new or better housing available to consumers who
would otherwise be unable to afford it. The emphasis was on encourage-
ment of mortgage lenders to lend rather than on encouragement of
particular groups of consumers to borrow. Subsequent legislation, how-
ever, has given the FHA an increasing consumer orientation. The tenns
of FHA-insured loans have been more and more differentiated among
various price and rental groups on the basis of social need rather than
of mortgage loan risks (although these two criteria need not be in
conflict) .Thisdifferentiation has been carried so far that, under
the FHA terms operative in the winter of 1952, the minimum down-
payment on a house appraised at $11,000 was almost five times as large
as the minimum downpayment on a house appraised at less than $7,000.
The first step in this direction was a 1938 amendment to the National
Housing Act, which permitted easier credit terms for newly constructed
small homes.8 The second step was the removal of the "economic
soundness" requirement for loans insured under the wartime amend-
ments to the act. War housing financed with FHA-insured loans was
to be "channeled" to war workers, many of whom would be unable
to buy houses without more liberal financing and borrower credit
ratings. The use of mortgage insurance for "channeling" new housing
into lower income groups was stated as a specific objective of the
Veterans Emergency Housing Program of 1946. Congressional hearings
Such a conflict does not exist to the extent that lower-priced houses have a
larger resale market and are therefore sounder security for mortgages with high
loan-to-value ratios.
8 Colean, The Impact of Government on Real Estate Finaiwe in the United
States, as cited, p. 98.
9 The program, as announced by the Housing Expediter on February 7, 1946,
included the following recommendation: "Channeling the largest part of material
into homes and rental housing, both farm and urban, selling for not more than
$6,000 or renting for not more than $50 per month." The announcement also
specified: "To provide moderately priced homes with a maximum of rental units,
it is necessary for the government to offer greater incentives for the building of
such housing. This can be achieved by insuring mortgages on low-cost homes for
builders to the extent of 90 per cent of value. Furthermore, such mortgages must
be based on necessary current costs of construction rather than on long-term
economic value and they should be amortized over a long period." (MimeographedROLE OF FEDERAL AIDS 151
on comprehensive housing legislation during the late war and the
postwar period reveal a consistent emphasis on the development of
special financing tools for construction suited for "middle-income
families," the groups between those served by private enterprise with
existing government aids and those to be served by publicly financed
housing.b0 Such tools were provided in the Housing Acts of 194811
and 1950.12
The extent to which the objective of widening the market has in fact
been met is difficult to determine, even in the relatively simple case of
new single-family houses for owner occupancy. The credit restrictions,
issued in 1950 upon the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and suspended
in September 1952, and the temporary materials restrictions caused by
the military preparedness programs tended to limit the immediate use
of the financing tools enacted in 1948 and 1950. Moreover, the historical
data required for assessing the influence of government aids on the
demand structure for new single-family houses are not available. The
Federal Housing Administration reports the income distribution of
purchasers of new single-family houses financed under its mortgage
insurance program. Similar information exists for all purchasers in
selected metropolitan districts for recent years. But there are no com-
prehensive time series on the distribution of purchase prices, of down-
payments, of debt charges classified by government-insured and con-
ventional mortgage financing, and of incomes of buyers of new houses.
However, a few observations are made possible by comparing the
characteristics of new house purchases financed with FHA and VA
loans with the characteristics of new house purchases financed with
conventional mortgages during 1949 and 1950.
statement of the Housing Expediter.) These changes were incorporated in amend-
ments, enacted May 22, 1946, to Title VI of the National Housing Act.
10Forexample, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban
Redevelopment of the Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Plan-
ning, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (1945), pursuant to S. Res. 102, esp. pp. 1301-1305.
Also, Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1592,
79th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rept. 1131 (Ceneral Housing Act of 1946).
11Colean,The Impact of Government on Real Estate Finance in the United
States, as cited, pp. 124-125, esp. Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 9.
12PublicLaw 475, 81st Cong., approved April 20, 1950. The principal features
of this act designed to widen the market are special financing provisions for
cooperative housing (Section 213), and more liberal financing terms for small
homes (Sections 8 and 611), as well as for rental housing projects (Section 207).
These measures were taken "with the object of encouraging greater production
of homes for middle-income families" (Fourth Annual Report, Housing and Home
Finance Agency, 1950, p. 213). In addition, the law authorized a maximum of
$150,000,000 in direct loans by the Veterans' Administration under specified con-
ditions, increased the guarantee for VA home loans generally from 50 per cent of
appraised value not to exceed $4,000 to 60 per cent not to exceed $7,500, and
extended the maximum maturity from 25 to 30 years.152 ROLEOFFEDERAL AIDS
Table39 shows a concentration of purchases financed with govern-
ment-insured loans in the $6,000-to-12,000 price class. More than
four-fifths of all FHA- and VA-financed purchases, and only two-fifths
of purchases financed with conventional loans, fell into this category.
TABLE 39
Distribution of Purchase Prices of New Owner-Occupied Single-Family Houses
Financed with Mortgage Loans, by Type of Mortgage Financing,
1949 and 1950
FHA AND VA





































Total reporting407,000 bOa 312,000 100 57
a Components do not add to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Based on Census of Housing 1950, Bureau of the Census, Preliminary
Reports, "Mortgaged, Residential, Nonfarm Properties Acquired during 1949 and
First Half of 1950," Series HC-9, No. 1, Table 5. The data are from a sample
survey and are subject to sampling errors detailed in the Bureau publication.
Within this price range the government programs operated largely in
the $6,000-to-10,000 class. Almost two-thirds of FHA- and VA-financed
purchases, and only 28 per cent of purchases with conventional loans,
were for houses priced at $6,000 to $10,000. On the other hand, only
4 per cent of all houses purchased with government-insured loans were
priced at less than $6,000, whereas almost one-third of the houses
purchased with conventional mortgages were in this price group.
Similarly, only 14 per cent of all FHA- and VA-financed purchases,
as against 29 per cent of all purchases financed with conventional loans,
were in the price class of $12,000 or more. About three-fourths of all
new mortgaged houses bought for $6,000 to less than $12,000 were
financed with government-insured loans. Here again, the corresponding
ratios for the lower-priced and higher-priced houses are much smaller.
Thus the federal programs were operative largely in the medium
price field, with emphasis on the lower range of this field. Their small
share in the price class under $6,000 may be due to failure of many of
these houses to meet minimum construction standards of the FHA
and the VA. Also, large numbers of lower-priced houses are in small
towns where FHA and VA facilities are less accessible or in locationsROLE OF FEDERAL AIDS 153
not acceptable for mortgage insurance or guarantee. In any event, the
number of houses in this price class accounted for less than 16 per cent
of the total.
Downpayments made on these purchases varied significantly with
type of financing. The median downpayment was 8 per cent of the
purchase price for houses bought with VA first mortgages, 22 per cent
for those bought with FHA first mortgages, and 35 per cent for those
purchased with conventional first mortgages.'3 These differences in
conjunction with the purchase price data suggest that reduction of
downpayments through federal insurance and guarantee programs was
a factor in stimulating demand for medium- and low-priced houses
which otherwise would have been out of reach of many families.
Nevertheless, the evidence is by no means conclusive. The reduction
of downpayments may have had the effect of causing a number of
house purchasers to devote a smaller proportion of their liquid assets
to this purpose than they would have done otherwise, or to buy more
expensive houses.' Also, from a historical point of view, downpay-
ments have been reduced much less than a comparison of maximum
loan-to-value ratios for government-insured and for conventional loans
would indicate. Before the initiation of the federal programs, junior
mortgages often filled much of the gap between purchase price and
first mortgage. Finally, the almost universal inclusion of payments on
principal in debt service on single-family houses, though a sounder
financing practice, has tended to absorb much of the advantage to
borrowers resulting from the consolidation of multiple loans into high-
percentage first mortgages at lower interest rates and for longer con-
tract terms.'5
Thus the extent to which the federal programs have succeeded in
widening the market for new construction is not determinable from
available data, but some progress in this direction has probably been
made. At the same time, widening the market for new residential
building has clearly emerged as a continuous and major objective of
13Basedon Census of Housing 1950, Bureau of the Census, Preliminary Reports,
"Mortgaged, Residential, Nonfarm Properties Acquired during 1949 and First Hall
of 1950," Series HC-9, No. 1, Table 12. The data are from a sample survey and are
subject to sampling errors detailed in the Bureau publication. ''Thusa survey of purchases from October 1950 to March 1951 revealed that
about one-fourth of house purchasers had left-over liquid assets valued at $1,000
or more, and about one-tenth had liquid assets valued at $2,000 or more, after
purchase on terms prevalent before Regulation X. Federal Reserve Bulletin, July
1951, p. 779. See also Daniel B. Rathbun, "Liquid Assets: A Neglected Factor in
the Formulation of Housing Finance Policies," Journal of Finance, December 1952.
For the relationship between financing terms and purchase price see Ernest M.
Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets: Characteristics and Financing, National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1951, pp. 69-90.
'5Thispoint is examined in greater detail in Chapter XIV.154 ROLE OF FEDERALAIDS
federalhousing policies and one that has direct bearing on the volume
of housing construction in the long run.
Sales Housing vs. Rental Housing
Have the federal programs influenced the proportions of new con-
struction for rental and sale? The FHA has often been accused of
unduly promoting housing for owner occupancy to the neglect of rental
housingis and the veterans' home loan program is, of course, exclusively
designed for purchase (although houses bought by veterans include
additional dwelling units for rent in a small number of cases).
The facts on this point are complex. On the statistical record, the
proportion of dwelling units in new multi-family structures to the total
number of new dwelling units has been lower in the period of FHA
and VA operations than during any similar period since the turn
of the century—about 11 per cent for 1935 through 1953.' Also, the
volume of rental housing construction during the recent postwar period
was relatively low compared with a similar period after World War I.
From 1946 through 1953 little over 10 per cent of all new dwelling units
were in multi-family structures (Table 38). From 1920 through 1927
more than double this percentage was of the rental housing type.
It does not follow, however, that government aids for multi-family
rental housing have been quantitatively less important than those for
housing for sale. It is true that before World War lithe share of
FHA-financed rental construction in total rental construction was
much lower than the share of FHA-flnanced building for owner
occupancy in total building for owner-occupancy (as is evident from
a comparison of the last two columns of Table 37). But there was a
reversal after the war. From 1947 to 1953 the share of FHA-financed
rental construction in total rental construction was much higher than
the share of owner-occupied housing built with both FHA and VA
loans in total building for owner occupancy. During the five years
1947-1951 about 80 per cent of the annual production of rental housing
was financed by FHA loans, with a decline to 60 and 40 per cent,
respectively, in 1952 and 1953, following the termination of operations
under Section 608 in 1950.
The two phenomena of the small relative importance of rental
16See,for example, Charles Abrams, The Future of Hou.sing, Harper, 1946,
pp. 224-225.'SeeTable 38 for data for 1935-1953 and Chapter III for data for years prior
to 1935. Multi-family structures are defined as structures with three or more dwell-
ing units. Structures with two dwelling units usually provide at least one unit for
rent. The inclusion of these would increase the proportion of units for rent to total
units, but would not change the statement that the 1935-1953 ratio was lower than
that during any similar period since 1900.ROLE OF FEDERAL AIDS 155
housing since World War II and of the large share of FHA financing
in rental housing can be reconciled. Many factors other than govern-
ment financial aids have influenced the volume of rental housing
construction. Among these are a possible long-term shift in consumers'
preferenees for single-family houses, fortified by the rise in real income
and liquid assets since 1940 and the tax advantages of home ownership;
the financial hazards of rental housing construction during a period
of rapidly changing costs; and uncertainties over the long-run earning
capacity of new projects when rent controls are removed.18
To meet the obstacles to rental housing construction during the
postwar period, and in response to public pressure for a greater volume
of rental housing, easy FHA-financing arrangements under the war-
time Section 608 of the National Housing Act were renewed until
1950 and even liberalized.' In spite of these efforts, the quantity of
building for rent was relatively small, but the overwhelming proportion
of this small quantity was financed by liberal FHA loans. The rewards
for rental project builders using FHA financing were unusually attrac-
tive. In many cases builders could fully or nearly "mortgage out" on
loans representing 90 per cent of "necessary current costs" and were
able to reap large profits on very thin equities. In other cases cost
estimates as approved for mortgage insurance were in excess of actual
costs, as disclosures made in the spring of 1954 on Section 608 projects
revealed.20 That these attractions did not produce any larger volume
of rental housing is perhaps a measure of the postwar hazards of con-
structing residences for rent. It is safe to conclude that the quantity
of rental housing would have been even smaller if the liberal FHA
aids had not existed.
18Cf.Leo Grebler, "Implications of Rent Control—Experience in the United
States," International Labour Review, April 1952.
9Amongother things, the appraisal basis was changed from "reasonable
replacement cost" to "necessary current cost" and later to "costs prevailing Decem-
ber 31, 1947"; and higher maximum mortgage amounts per room were authorized.
20FHAInvestigation. Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency. S. Rep. 1, 84th Cong., 1st sess., January 6, 1955.